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Abstract 
 
The aim of this article is to describe Estonia’s economic development strategy in the 
Baltic  Sea  region  primarily  from  the  perspective  of  labour  costs  as  a  factor  in 
international  competitiveness.  Estonia’s  position  in  the  international  division  of 
economic activities will be explored based on expert assessments in the context of a 
study of theoretical literature about labour compensation as a factor in international 
competitiveness.  The differences between the impact of the economic boom and 
crisis periods on the level and dynamics of employee compensation (labour related 
expenditures),  and  gross  and  net  salary  in  Estonia  at  the  national  level  will  be 
empirically analysed. An empirical analysis will also be performed to describe the 
changes in the structure of economic activities (NACE-classification) in Estonia.  
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1. Introduction 
 
For a long time, the cornerstones of Estonian economic policy were considered to 
be:  the  currency  board  system,  the  absence  of  barriers  (import  taxes/tariffs  and 
export subsidies) in foreign trade, advantageous entrepreneurial taxation for foreign 
capital,  the  constantly  low  level  of  salaries  partly  due  to  the  low  level  of  the 
nationally  fixed  minimum  wage  and  the  overall  low  tax  burden.  At  first,  these 
factors seemed to enhance and ensure Estonia’s economic development. Estonia was 
considered the most successful amongst the “Baltic tigers”. In addition, during the 
period from 2000 to 2007 Estonia belonged to the group of countries in the EU with 
the highest economic growth rates (Levasseur 2011: 3; Brixiova et al. 2010: 57). 
 
In 2008, the economic crisis hit most EU countries, but the impact of the crisis was 
the  strongest  and  most  devastating  in  Estonia  and  in  the  other  Baltic  countries. 
Researchers from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy have raised an intriguing 
question: have the “tigers” become the “carpets in front of the bed (Bettvorlage)” 
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(Schrader, Laaser 2010). The crisis clearly demonstrated that the comparison (with 
Estonia being the Baltic tiger) was merely a fictional exaggeration. A more realistic 
comparison would have seen Estonia as a diligent “mouse catcher”. To be precise, 
Estonia is an assiduous apprentice who takes all the advice of the master as pure 
gold ignoring the fact that the master himself does not always follow his own words.  
 
The Estonian government has consistently tried to design a good environment for 
attracting foreign investment in the hope of securing jobs and income for its people. 
Simultaneously, financial capital gained most of the attention and the status of a god 
for which the people and the rest of the economy had to work and serve. On the 
other hand, financial capital (during the new formation of market sharing by the 
banks) created the spectacular illusion for society (individuals and businesses) that it 
is  possible  to  boost  the  economy  and  achieve  the  desired  welfare  thanks  to  an 
unstoppable inflow of foreign credit and without saving (for example, in order to 
invest). The majority of the people and businesses were (and still are) debt trapped. 
The final effects are yet to be seen. The economic boom induced by foreign credit 
followed by the economic downturn and deep recession provided the arguments for 
reassessing the fundamentals and the sustainability of Estonian economic policy; 
and hence, the development perspective.  
 
Households  and  enterprises  are  closely  related  through  income.  Changes  in  the 
structure and size of income send signals about general developments (positive and 
negative)  in  the  economy.  Beyond  doubt,  the  welfare  of  households  is  directly 
influenced by the size of their income. Another important and sensitive area that is 
influenced by income size (and the development of it) is social security expenditure 
that is usually financed through income taxation. Social tax (computed on the basis 
of gross wage) is divided between the current pensions (16% of the gross wage) and 
health  insurance  (13%)  for health  related  expenditures.  In  addition,  the  Estonian 
Unemployment Insurance Fund receives 1.4% of total gross wages. Income tax has 
an  important  role  to  play  in  the  budgets  of  local  governments  because  local 
governments  are  the  public  institutions  that  provide  the  inhabitants  with  public 
services and  promote regional  development.  In  2009,  the  amount  of  income  tax 
allotted to local government budgets was reduced by a central government decision 
from 11.93% to 11.4% of total gross wages. The average amount of income tax 
revenue in the budget of local governments exceeded 50% in 2008 and dropped to 
just  under  50%  in  2009  (Estonian  ...  2011).  In  light  of  this,  the  author  will 
empirically  analyse,  on  the  basis  of  gross  wage  developments,  the  path  to  the 
economic crisis and the consequences of the crisis in Estonia for general economic 
policy.  
 
The aim of this article is to assess the fundamentals of Estonian economic policy 
against the background of the economic crisis and the development of gross wages 
before and during the crisis generally and also between economic activities. The 
following research questions have been considered:  
  To  analyze  the  alleged  economic  and  political  reasons  behind  Estonia’s 
economic success story 216 
  To analyze Estonian economic policy in light of the economic crisis and to 
assess its actual prospects 
  To analyze the general developments in gross wage and the differences between 
economic activities before and during the crisis 
 
The  discussion  is  based  on  various  economic  experts’  assessments  of  economic 
development  in  the  Baltics.  The  empirical  analysis  uses  data  from  Eurostat  and 
Statistics  Estonia  online  databases.  The  data  allows  the  author  to  analyse  the 
development  of  the  gross  wage  generally  and  also  between  various  economic 
activities.  
 
1. Expectations of catching up with advanced economies 
 
Like some other countries, Estonia must develop an economic growth and welfare 
strategy to overcome the economic gap with the economically more advanced EU 
countries.  In  a  situation  where  people  can  freely  move  between  countries,  the 
difference in economic development may induce an emigration wave of young and 
more sophisticated (educated) people. They look for prosperous work opportunities, 
better living conditions and a safer social environment outside their home country 
where the general chances of finding “a better life” are more likely. The emigration 
of young people may in turn further hinder the economic development of the home 
country and even perpetuate and deepen its economic backwardness. 
 
After  Estonia  joined  the  EU  in  2004,  it  seemed  that  Estonia  had  found  and 
implemented its economic success strategy. During the period from 1995 to 2004 
the average (yearly) real GDP growth rate was 6.1%, and for 2000–2004, 7.2%. The 
liberal  political  parties  assumed  that  long-term,  consistent,  diligent  and  prudent 
monetary,  budgetary  and  economic  policy  were  behind  this  development  (Paet 
2005). From the outside this assumption seemed to be well-grounded: 
  Compared  to  when  the  Estonian  kroon  was  introduced,  the  inflation  rate 
dropped  from  90%  in  1993  to  1.4%  in  2003,  presumably  due  to  the 
implementation of the currency board system or fixed exchange rate system 
(Laurson, Grawe 2004). Beyond doubt, the fixed exchange rate system reduces 
inflationary pressure due to decreasing export income if the currencies of export 
partners drop in value. The Estonian export sector has experienced these effects 
in trade with Russia and Sweden where the ruble and the crown were devalued. 
Regardless  of  the  detrimental  effects  to  Estonian  exports,  the  governmental 
circuits found the currency board system to be justified and consider it one of 
the key elements of the Estonian economic success strategy. Joining the EU in 
2004 would maintain and guarantee price stability and also provide a safe and 
smooth path to the euro zone.  
  The  rapid  privatization  of  former  state  owned  property  brought  a  relatively 
large amount of foreign investments to Estonia. This was considered the direct 
consequence of liberal economic policy, and therefore, the privatization process 
of large public enterprises was called to continue (Laurson, Grawe 2004). The 
inflow of foreign direct investments was remarkable: from 1995 to 2003 the 217 
amount  of  foreign  direct  investment  grew  more  than  9.46  times  (as  a 
comparison, it was 3.43 times in the Baltic region as a whole) (Liuhto 2005). 
Foreign  direct  investment  was  therefore  considered  a  prerequisite  for  the 
internationalization of Estonia and future foreign direct investments flows out 
of  Estonia (Purju  2004).  Accession  to  the  EU  was  favourable for  attracting 
foreign direct investments. Estonia became easily accessible and possessed a 
Western entrepreneurial regulatory system. Therefore, Estonia often became the 
platform  for  the  first  internationalization  steps  for  many  small  and  medium 
sized  Finnish  enterprises  and  for  their  further  expansion  to  other  Baltic 
countries  (Kosonen,  Heliste  2005;  Heiskanen  2006).  However,  Estonian 
dependence  on  foreign  direct  investment  was  seen  as  a  threat  to  Finnish 
enterprises already active in Estonia (Alho et al. 2004). On the other hand, a 
general euphoria prevailed among politicians (Parts 2007; Kauppi 2007; Ansip 
2008). 
  Although  Estonia  is  generally  characterized  by  a  low  tax  burden,  the 
government  managed  not  only  to  balance  the  budget  but  also  to  achieve  a 
budget surplus and therefore collect reserves. It seemed that there was a way to 
afford and guarantee education, healthcare and safety services to people with an 
acceptably  low  level  of  expenditure  not  only  in  absolute  terms  but  also 
relatively as a percentage of GDP
3 compared to advanced EU member states. In 
reality  this  “low  cost  development”  was  possible  only  because  of  the 
amortization  of  human  and  infrastructure  resources  that  had  already  been 
created in the past. 
  The wage level in Estonia was relatively low compared to that of its Central 
European competitors. Therefore, remarkable growth was achieved in labour 
productivity, partly due to the flow of the labour force from low productivity 
economic  sectors  to  high  productivity  ones  (Laurson,  Grawe  2004).  A 
prognosis  aimed  at  the  entrepreneurs  in  advanced  old  EU  member  states 
forecast that despite this growth tendency, over 25 years the wage level in the 
new member states would only make up 75% of the old member states’ wage 
level, due to the very low initial level (Alho et al. 2004). The cost level in 
Sweden  is  seven  times higher  than  in  Estonia and  ten  times higher  than  in 
Latvia. Furthermore, workers in Estonia are not sufficiently organized. About 
80% of the workers in the Nordic countries belong to unions, whereas only 
about 10% do in Estonia. Collective agreements in the Nordic countries cover 
more than 80–90% of workers and only 25% in Estonia (Sippola 2006). On the 
other hand, there were also sceptics who did not believe in the sustainability of 
the low wage based economic development strategy because economic growth 
inevitably brings pressure to increase wages (Ketels 2006). 
  The level of social expenditure in Estonia as a ratio to GDP was 50% lower 
than the average in the EU – according to Eurostat, the ratio in Estonia was 
about 13% of GDP and approximately 26% in the EU. Assessed in purchasing 
power  parity  prices,  the  level  of  social  expenditure  per  capita  in  Estonia 
constituted only 25–30% of the EU average level. Remarkably, the extremely 
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low level of social expenditure and social security did not cause any uprisings 
or  public  discontent.  This  seems  to  be  in  accordance  with  the  individual 
responsibility  approach  compared  to  the  welfare  model  (a  policy  approach 
based on high solidarity, implemented in Nordic and other EU countries). The 
economic reasoning supporting the development of the Baltic economic region 
was to move labour intensive production activities from countries with high 
wage and social cost levels to regions and peripheries where, in the medium 
term, the supply of all social protection services is not presumed (Akerholm 
2005). The Nordic countries were conveniently looking for cheap labour, and 
therefore, their recommendations for the Baltic states were to the reduce labour 
related  taxes,  which  are  the  main  funding  source  for  social  expenditure 
(Laurson, Grawe 2004). 
 
Therefore, on the one hand, joining the EU was considered an acknowledgement of 
Estonia’s successful economic policies (Lehtomäki 2005), and on the other hand, a 
guarantee of the further success of this policy. Although by 2004, the total current 
account  deficit  and  the  inflow  of  foreign  credit  were  seen  as  “challenges”  to 
sustainable economic development (Laurson, Grawe 2004), they were not treated as 
real threats. Therefore, no countermeasures were taken. The main weakness of and 
real threat to the Estonian entrepreneurial environment was considered to be the 
overall shoddy quality of public administration (Alho et al. 2004).  
 
2. Fiction versus reality in the economic development potential of Estonia 
 
To assess the economic development perspectives, it is important to clarify which of 
Estonia’s strategies guarantees it continuous economic development success within 
the  EU  framework.  In  the  1990s,  endogenous  growth  theories  were  formulated 
(Romer  1990;  Romer,  Rivera-Batiz  1991)  and  gained  popularity.  These  theories 
emphasize  the  importance  of  research  and  development  (R&D)  for  achieving 
innovation-based  economic  growth.  This  approach  also  influenced  Estonia’s 
economic perspectives. In the 1997 development strategy (named “Estonia 2010”) 
(Terk 2007), the main development determinant for Estonia was seen in the field of 
information and communication technology (ICT), in addition to bridging Russia 
and Western Europe. The aim  was to gain a leading position in developing and 
applying new technical solutions for ICT. Of course, there was no real basis for such 
expectations and even less for setting such an ambitious strategic development aim, 
especially  in  the  field  of  ICT.  The  objective  lacked  resources  and  capability,  in 
addition to political will. The public sector was not ready to find the resources and to 
organize (and guide) the work for the declared objective.  
 
Gaining a leading position in the ICT  field did not correspond to Estonia’s real 
position in the division of labour between EU member states. Finland has foreseen 
for  Estonia  and  other  Baltic  countries  a  position  of  intermediate  producer  for 
international  corporations  that  would  act  as  final  producers.  When  forming 
education, applied research, standards and other policies, the Estonian government 
has to consider its position within the EU’s division of labour (Hyvärinen 2005). 
The advice given was to enhance the educational, scientific and communications 219 
infrastructure in addition to the preparation (training) of a highly skilled labour force 
in order to satisfy the needs of international corporations for cheap outsourcing. 
Estonian enterprises should have constantly made an effort to find contracts and 
orders  in  advanced  economies  for  outsourcing  intermediate  production.  Estonia 
hoped to generate and benefit from spillover effects due to technological knowledge 
and experience transfer from more developed partner firms.  
 
On the one hand this approach may be practical, but on the other hand, this is a very 
long route to building up an innovation and knowledge based economy. According 
to this approach, Estonia’s position as the intermediate producer is not a make-do 
caused by Estonian backwardness in order to guarantee the mere existence of the 
Estonian  economy,  but  a  development  strategy  for  the  coming  years.  However, 
Estonian entrepreneurs should overcome this role as possibly quickly. This approach 
implies that Estonia’s public sector should not support Estonian entrepreneurs in 
becoming  final  producers  but  instead  help  them  step-by-step  in  becoming  more 
developed intermediate producers. Although international final producers have high 
standards  and  requirements  towards  intermediate  producers  and  learning  effects 
occur  between  the  final  and  the  intermediate  producer,  the  likely  technological 
spillover from the final producer to the intermediate producer is not remarkable. An 
economic  strategy  built  on  intermediate  production  is  not  the  best  strategy  for 
entering  the  innovation  based  “new  economy”  and  catching  up  with  advanced 
economies. Nevertheless earning the status and position of “developed intermediate 
producers” seems to be a logical step for the Baltic countries, assessed on the base of 
current R&D expenditures. In 2003, Estonia had a R&D expenditure to GDP ratio of 
0.77%, whereas Sweden’s was 4.27%, Finland 3.51% and Denmark 2.60% (Savo, 
Elo 2005). By 2009, Estonia’s ratio had nearly doubled to 1.42% of GDP, which 
was still very low compared to the Nordic countries. According to Eurostat the ratio 
of R&D expenditure to GDP in 2009 was 3.96% in Finland, 3.6% in Sweden and 
3.02% in Denmark.  
 
A more sophisticated approach considered Estonia’s chances of catching up with the 
more  advanced  economies  by  attracting  foreign  direct  investment.  At  first  the 
foreign  direct  investment  based  strategy  seemed  to  work:  the  direct  investment 
position grew from €9.56 billion in 2005 to €11.87 billion in 2008, the growth was 
more than €2.31 billion (24.2%) In 2009, the direct investment position decreased to 
€11.28 billion (Bank of Estonia online database). Nevertheless, the impact of EU 
accession may be assessed as positive. 
 
On the other hand, a negative tendency has also developed: the amount of foreign 
direct investments leaving Estonia (outflow position) has also grown from €1.64 
billion  in  2005  to  €4.76  billion  in  2008;  the  increase  amounts  to  €3.12  billion 
(192%). Although the outflow position decreased to €4.6 billion in 2009, the growth 
rate of Estonian direct investment abroad has been about 10 times faster than the 
growth  rate  of  foreign  direct  investment  in  Estonia.  The  ratio  of  the  direct 
investment position abroad to the direct investment position in Estonia has grown 
from 17.2% in 2005 to 40.8% in 2009.  
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To sum up, Estonia seems to be less attractive to foreign capital since EU accession 
than before – capital outflow has exceeded capital inflow. The reasons behind this 
are:  
  The tax system in Estonia is attractive to investors who are trying to employ 
cheap labour and serve the Estonian (local) market. The current tax system is 
not beneficial to capital that produces innovative export goods. Only 15% of 
foreign direct investment is directed to the manufacturing industry (Bank of 
Estonia data 2010); a remarkable part is invested in the local food industry.  
  A large number of businesses that run on foreign capital use a low-skilled and 
low-paid labour force for labour intensive intermediate operations (the quality 
control and assembly of details). This kind of work raises (of course artificially) 
the volume of export-import transactions, but consequently local value added is 
deplorably small.  
  Foreign investors oriented towards satisfying the needs of the local market have 
already made the necessary investments in some business fields (e.g. financial, 
communication and trade). But there are only limited opportunities for using 
earned profits in the country. Investors who made profits in Estonia are looking 
to invest these profits in countries with developing markets outside Estonia. 
  In Estonia distributed profit is taxed (e.g. when dividends are paid). Businesses 
that run on foreign capital have found various ways of distributing profit tax-
free. Examples are: investment in subsidiaries acting abroad until 2009, loans to 
parent companies or subsidiaries until 2009 and after. Therefore, the outflow of 
foreign direct investment exceeds the inflow from 2005 to 2008. 
 
To conclude, the inflow and outflow of foreign direct investment and its dynamics 
(in addition to structure and volume) show that an economic development strategy 
founded primarily on foreign direct investment does not make catching up with the 
more advanced economies possible. Foreign capital targeted at servicing the local 
market  and  employing  a  low-skilled  labour  force  preserves  Estonia’s  economic 
backwardness.  There  are  no  relevant  arguments  for  establishing  innovative  and 
export-oriented  production  or  the  research  and  development  phases  involved  to 
Estonia.  In  the  structure  of  current  foreign  capital  there  is  little  hope  for 
technological spillover effects to the Estonian export sector.  
 
From  a  broader  and  global  perspective,  when  accepted  by  the  inhabitants, 
maintaining a low tax burden is essential for economic success. But focusing on this 
element (as a key element in the strategy) may develop into a problem. The tax 
burden  is  an  important  issue  influencing  the  international  competitiveness  of  a 
country, especially in an environment where the free movement of goods, services, 
capital  and  people  is  applied.  The  Nordic  countries  declared  the  necessity  to 
harmonize  corporate taxes as  the  most  important  factor  for  successful  economic 
development in the Baltic region (Svedberg 2006). Tax harmonization in Europe has 
evolved into a political issue, and the debate is currently being led by Germany. 
Although there are no reasonable grounds (neither social nor political) for raising the 
general tax burden in Estonia, the pressure coming from the advanced economies for 
corporate tax harmonization is considerable. 221 
Low wage levels are undoubtedly attractive to businesses that exploit a low-skilled 
and low-paid labour force, but unions abroad tolerate outsourcing of intermediate 
production only so long as it does not become a threat and compete with the high-
skilled  and  high-paid  labour  force  at  home.  Therefore,  in  developing  the  Baltic 
economy, another precondition is often mentioned: the prevention of any kind of 
“friction” in the labour market (Svedberg 2005). Assuming low wages and price 
stability in the long run is not realistic in the process of catching up with the more 
advanced economies. Niels Mygind (2006) reasonably explained that in a country 
with a currency board system (fixed exchange rate), growth in productivity induces 
the appreciation of its currency, which in turn manifests itself in a general rise in 
wages and prices. He forecasted that by 2025 in an environment of fast economic 
growth, Estonia would have reached the general average level of GDP per capita and 
prices in the EU. Only a slowdown of economic growth would have obstructed the 
general rise of prices and wages. The economic crisis in 2009 and the recovery in 
2010 confirmed the validity of the previous statement. 
 
Paavo  Okko  (2007)  has  explained  that  the  convergence  between  the  new  EU 
countries  with  low  wages and  the  old  EU  countries  is  a  long  term  and  arduous 
process. At first the new EU countries are able to achieve quicker growth rates in 
wages  (β-convergence),  but  the  overall  absolute  differences  in  nominal  wages 
remain (σ-convergence will not be achieved). If Estonia could have maintained an 
average 6.6% yearly growth in real GDP from 2008 to 2015 against Finland’s 3.8% 
(average growth rates for these countries for 2000–2005), then the real GDP per 
capita in Estonia would have doubled while Finland’s would have grown 1.5 times. 
At the same time, the difference in the level of nominal wages would rise by 70%. 
When  the  differences  in  wages  between  the  Baltic  states  and  highly  developed 
countries is 5–10 times, then a 10% rise in wages does not cause irreversible damage 
to the international competitiveness of the Baltic states. A relatively low level of 
average wages (in 2006 the average Estonian wage was only 25% of Germany’s) is 
still  (even  after  the  economic  crisis)  an  important  factor  of  international 
competitiveness,  although  a  high  level  of  unemployment  will  characterize  the 
Estonian economy for a while (Wiegert 2009). 
 
In the case of low wages, another negative tendency often develops. Low wages 
negatively influence the labour force’s qualifications, especially in technical fields, 
which  are  important  for  innovation-based  development.  Young  people  are  not 
motivated to learn sophisticated technical subjects when finding a job in these fields 
is difficult and the wages are low in Estonia. Therefore, working abroad becomes an 
attractive opportunity for highly qualified young people. 
 
In addition to the growing differences in average wages between countries (despite 
the higher growth rates in low wage countries), there are also growing differences 
between  regions  within  the  countries,  reflected  in  the  growth  of  cities  and  the 
decline of rural areas, together with the loss of population there (Damsgaard 2008). 
As a result, land prices in the city rise while general living conditions deteriorate, if 
the  city  cannot  offer  necessary  public  infrastructure  and  social  services.  This 
becomes a serious threat to the development of quick growing cities or parishes. 222 
Undoubtedly the low level of social expenditure can also be seen as a factor raising 
overall  economic competitiveness.  This  is  possible when  the interests of  foreign 
investors who do not have to consider the long-term economic and social needs of 
the destination country dominate. Estonia has joined the European Social Charter, 
which sets relatively high standards for the social protection of people. As a result of 
the lack of public pressure, the obligations accepted when joining the Charter have 
become a secondary consideration. They have been left to the conscience and morals 
of the ruling elite. At the moment, perspectives on social policies built on low costs 
are not that clear: especially France, Germany and Austria have raised the question 
and problem of “social dumping”, which is a complex and serious hindrance to the 
economic integration process of the EU (Terk 2006).  
 
The  government  strategy  approach  to  “not  interfere”  in  market  processes  seems 
reasonable as long as the functioning of the economy is based on low wages and 
intermediate production. In a situation of growing pressure to increase wage levels 
and social expenditure, this approach is no longer adequate. The focus should be 
switched  to  achieving  productivity  growth,  which  is  only  possible  through 
innovation. For a transition to an innovation-based economic development strategy, 
consistent, systematic and long-term measures to build up various components of 
innovation systems become necessary. They refer to education, R&D, the protection 
of  intellectual  property  and  others.  Moreover,  strengthening  the  relationships 
between  the  components  of  the  nation  innovation  system  becomes  important. 
Additionally, firms must be included in the innovation system. This comprises the 
development  of  clusters,  the  establishment  of  cooperation  networks  and  the 
generation of development and innovation projects (Ketels 2006). The government’s 
fiscal and tax policy have an important role to play in promoting innovation. Today 
the trivial liberal economic policy adopted by the Estonian government does not 
support innovation. 
 
In conclusion, the current Estonian economic policy is not effective in strengthening 
international competition in the Baltic Sea region, or for catching up with the old 
(more advanced) EU countries. The economic growth in last decades was primarily 
based on the increasing volume of foreign capital serving Estonia’s internal market 
and  on  the  production  and  supply  of  unsophisticated  low-price  intermediate 
production. The economic boom was derived from the massive inflow of foreign 
credit, which fed an expansion in local (internal) demand. It is clearly stated in the 
Baltic  region  economic  development  report  that  the  crisis  ended  the  remarkable 
economic  growth  because  of  its  unsustainability  (in  the  long  run  economic 
development  cannot  be  based  on  foreign  credit  inflows).  Therefore,  economic 
differences started to grow once again during the economic crisis. The differences in 
capability for sustained innovation based development and high productivity will 
increase between highly developed and emerging countries (State ... 2009). Brixiova 
et al. (2010) analyzed the boom and the recession in Estonia and concluded that 
countries  functioning  under  currency  board  systems  and  with  a  liberal  foreign 
economic  policy  should  learn  from  history:  from  a  macroeconomic  perspective, 
flexibility is a necessity and the free movement of capital should be treated with 
caution. 223 
3. The importance of labour compensation for international competitiveness 
 
International  competitiveness  is  a  sophisticated  phenomenon,  especially  at  the 
country level. Nowadays, Boltho’s (1996: 1-2) assessment of 15 years ago is still 
relevant: there are no consistent definitions of competitiveness and the term seems to 
mean different things to different people. But at the same time most researchers 
evidently  do  not  share  Paul  Krugman’s  (1994:  44)  pessimistic  view  that  the 
application of the term “competitiveness” at the country level is meaningless, wrong 
and  dangerous.  Attempts  to  understand  the  nature  of  “competitiveness”  and 
quantitatively measure it have continued in various countries. Zanakis and Becerra-
Fernandez  (2005:  186)  distinguish  between  cost-competitiveness,  price-
competitiveness  and  non-price  competitiveness.  A  survey  presented  by  Eckhard 
Siggel  (2007)  points  out  that  different  researchers  accentuate  different  facets  of 
competitiveness;  for  example,  size  and  increase  of  market  share,  export 
performance,  price  ratios,  cost  competitiveness  and  so  on.  One  of  the  most 
widespread approaches pointed out in the literature is the concept of unit labour 
costs (ULC) as the product of wage rate, labour productivity and exchange rate. 
(Siggel 2007: 8).  
 
ULC as a part of total unit costs in production largely determine international price 
competitiveness, especially for less developed countries exporting labour intensive 
products. This article emphasises a contradictory aspect of ULC: while the producer 
wants  to  decrease  the  ULC  as  an  influential  factor  of  price  competition,  the 
employee wants to achieve a rise in real income as the basis of living standards. That 
means a decrease in ULC has to be achieved through raising labour productivity and 
not through the reduction of real income. The rise in a country’s competitiveness is 
often  described  through  improved  trade  balance  together  with  a  rise  in  living 
standards (real income) (Global ... 1985; Hatsopoulos et al. 1988)  
 
Fagerberg (1988: 355) takes the need to raise the real income of employees and adds 
the need to guarantee general employment: a country’s international competitiveness 
refers to the ability to implement central economic policy goals, especially achieving 
growth in real income and general employment levels, without causing problems to 
the  balance  of  payments.  “High  wage  countries  are  often  concerned  about  the 
relatively high level of their labour costs in the production of particular goods and 
services compared to low wage countries, in particular to the extent that such lower 
labour costs are the result of lower taxation, smaller social security payments, lower 
expenses on high-skilled labour for R&D and innovation, and in some cases, lower 
labour standards” (van Ark et al. 2005: 3). Labour standards are seen as being one of 
the most important factors for a country’s international competitiveness (Flanagan 
2003), but these costs are difficult to point out and compare, leading to the frequent 
discussion of whether the WTO could introduce common labour standards in order 
to avoid distortions in the measurement of international competitiveness. 
 
ULC integrates the income of employees with the expenditure of producers. Buckley 
et al. (1988: 186) emphasise the paradox that the countries with the fastest growth in 
exports and in GDP have at the same time experienced much quicker growth in unit 224 
labour  costs  than  other  countries.  That  means  that  in  developed  countries  with 
advanced  economies,  price  competitiveness  depends  primarily  on  introducing 
qualitatively new (innovative) products and not on ULC. These innovative products 
are  the  logical  and  expected  side  effects  of  investments  in  product  R&D  and 
technological change. Therefore, the indicators of innovativeness of a country have 
mostly been assessed through factors of international competitiveness (Buckley et 
al. 1988: 189). 
 
In the Ricardian two-country two-product international trade model only the labour 
costs are considered a factor that determines the comparative advantage of a country. 
Dornbusch et al. (1977) developed this model of the continuum of goods, which 
means to n-product model but the labour costs remained the factor determining the 
international/relative competitiveness. The production of a product in one country is 
internationally competitive if the ratio of the domestic wage rate to the competitors’ 
wage rate is lower in comparison to the ratio of domestic labour productivity to the 
competitors’. In reality, the production of goods incorporates many  more factors 
besides ULC; therefore, other models have been developed, for example, the model 
of domestic resources costs and total unit costs (see Siggel 2007), but in this case the 
analysis will be limited to labour costs. 
 
Michael  E.  Porter  (1990:  73)  emphasizes  that  a  country’s  competitiveness 
determines its prosperity, created through its industry’s capacity to innovate and 
upgrade. He is critical of the prevailing thinking that labour costs, interest rates, 
exchange  rates  and  economies  of  scale  are  the  most  powerful  determinants  of 
competitiveness  (Porter  1990:  74).  Porter  developed  what  is  referred  to  as  the 
“diamond” of national competitive advantage as a comprehensive new approach for 
the  comparative  analysis  of  competitiveness,  comprising  four  parts:  factor 
conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries, and firm strategy, 
structure and rivalry (Porter 1990: 77). Under factor conditions the first named is 
skilled  labour.  So  the  “diamond”  of  competitive  advantage  is  directly  related  to 
classical  approaches,  insisting  on  the  importance  of  labour  costs  for  ensuring 
international  competitiveness.  Especially  less  developed  countries  have  to 
compensate  for  disadvantages  in  other  facets  of  the  economic  competitiveness 
“diamond” through lower labour costs. Low unit labour costs (ULC) are frequently 
seen as the most important current and future comparative advantage of Central and 
Eastern European countries (Havlik 1998: 13).  
 
Porter’s “competitiveness diamond” (1990) model emphasizes that at the firm level, 
a firm’s strategy for ensuring competitiveness through the systematic and long-term 
planning  of  investments  is  receiving  more  and  more  importance.  Buckley  et  al. 
(1988:  194)  have  pointed  out  the  same  aspect  at  country  level:  “The  quality, 
effectiveness and management of government policies are analogous at the macro-
level to the strategy of the firm at the micro-level. Efficacious government policies 
can help to realise the potential competitive ability of a nation...” Governments must 
invest systematically and effectively in the development of the country’s innovation 
systems and innovation activities.  
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A country can apply different strategies to improve its international competitiveness 
(van Ark et al. 2005: 3). We have to distinguish short-run and long-run policies. In 
the short run a country can achieve success in the export sector by decreasing the 
labour costs per employee (the living standard of the population) but in an open 
economy this strategy is not effective. In the long run it is necessary to achieve 
growth in productivity (as the basis for the improvement of living standards), but 
this strategy can be developed only through a rise in investments.  
 
At the country level, welfare is characterised by GDP. A country’s GDP per person 
is the major determinant of the living standards in this country (Smith et al. 1982: 
13). We can measure labour productivity at the country level by GDP per employee 
and ULC; therefore, through the ratio of total gross salary to GDP.  
 
4. The general and sector development tendencies of gross wage in Estonia 
 
Development tendencies of the total sum of gross wages and nominal GDP show 
(chart 1) that from 1995 to 2003 the growth rate of nominal GDP exceeded the 
growth rate of the sum of gross wages.  
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Chart 1. The dynamics of the Estonian nominal GDP and the total sum of gross 
salaries from 1995 to 2011 (value of 1995 = 100), in % (Statistics Estonia online 
database 2012, compiled and drafted by author). 
 
Thereafter, for a couple of years the growth rates of both were equivalent. After 
Estonia’s accession to the EU, the huge inflow of credit money sharply expanded 
demand for labour. As a result, the average level of gross wages climbed, while on 
the other hand, the minimum level of employee qualifications, skills and knowledge 
diminished (low-qualified people found employment). In 2008, real GDP decreased 
and increased slightly nominally (only due to inflation). At the same time the growth 
in the sum of gross wages continued and outperformed nominal GDP’s growth rate. 
As a general result by 2008 compared to 1995, nominal GDP had grown 5.89 times 226 
and the sum of gross salaries 5.6 times. That means the ratio of the gross wage sum 
to  GDP  in  2008  was  nearly  the  same  as  in  1995.  The  economic  crisis  arrived 
unexpectedly  and  the  labour  policy  of  firms  was  not  properly  adapted.  The 
continuing recession in 2009 has not changed the ratio of the sum of gross wages to 
nominal GDP: by 2009 compared to 1995, the nominal GDP had grown 5.0 times 
and the sum of gross wages 4.78 times. In 2010 the sum of gross salaries continued 
to fall, meanwhile the GDP increased. In 2011, after rapid increase of GDP and 
modest increase of gross salaries, the proportion between these indicators is about 
the same as in 2007. 
 
Chart 2 shows the total ULC of nominal GDP in Estonia, the EU (average), Latvia, 
Lithuania, Finland and Sweden.  
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Chart 2. The total ULC of the nominal GDP in Estonia compared to the EU average 
and neighbouring countries for 2000–2011, in % (Eurostat online database 2012, 
compiled and drafted by author). 
 
The period examined can be divided into four sub-periods: 
  Until 2006, countries show various tendencies. In the EU on average and in 
Sweden the total ULC decreased; in Finland and Estonia the total ULC was 
stable; in Latvia and Lithuania the total ULC rose.  
  2007–2009, the economic boom and the crisis generally raised the total ULC of 
nominal GDP: in Estonia and in Latvia very sharply (in 2008 the total ULC 
even exceeded the level of this indicator in Finland), moderately in Finland and 
Sweden, and relatively modestly in Lithuania. After the crisis the total ULC has 
decreased. It is generally to see that the previous proportions across countries 
will  be  restored  (although  in  Finland  the  total  ULC  has  exceeded  the  EU 
average). Unusually, only Latvia managed to achieve a turnaround in the total 
ULC trend earlier than other countries, due to general wage reductions in 2009. 
Generally, in the EU (based on the average) and other countries the total ULC 
has shown a slight tendency to decrease during the previous years. 227 
The changes in unit labour cost levels during the economic boom and crisis have 
influenced  Estonia’s  international  competitiveness  more  than  neighbouring 
countries. In 2006, the ratio of employee compensation costs to GDP in Estonia was 
2% down on Finland’s and the EU average and 4% down on Sweden. Latvia and 
Lithuania  came  closer  to  the  level  of  the  total  ULC  in  Estonia.  In  2009,  the 
examined ratio in Estonia was almost equal to the ratio in Finland and 2% higher 
than the EU average. Although Estonia was 4% lower than Sweden, the ratio in 
Estonia was 4% higher than in Latvia and 7% higher than in Lithuania. During the 
last years, Estonia has restored its competitiveness position on the basis of total ULC 
compared to Finland and Sweden, but differences with Latvia and Lithuania have 
increased  slightly.  Obviously,  Latvia  and  Lithuania  are  trying  to  maintain  their 
reputation  for being  countries with  low  labour  costs,  meaning  Estonia will  have 
difficulties  with  its  Baltic neighbours  in  the  fierce  competition  for  lower  labour 
costs. Of course, nominal GDP and nominal labour expenditure are significantly 
lower than the EU average and especially in Finland and Sweden. According to 
Eurostat, the added value in market prices per person in 2011 was €8,400 in Estonia, 
€30,400  in  Sweden  and  €28,000  in  Finland.  Therefore,  compared  to  the  Nordic 
countries,  Estonia  remains  a  source  of  cheap  labour  force  and  intermediate 
production.  Compared  to  Latvia  and  Lithuania,  Estonia has to work  harder;  this 
means  being  more  productive  and  supplying  higher  quality  service  in  order  to 
compensate for its relatively higher wage levels compared to these countries. 
 
In addition to total ULC, the international competitiveness of firms is also strongly 
influenced by other taxes and the overall tax burden. Chart 3 shows the development 
of  GDP  in  terms  of  income  approach  and  its  distribution  between  the  business 
sector, households and the public sector. The net salary of the employees is their 
disposable income. Businesses earn gross operating surplus and mixed income, the 
amortization of basic production investments and subsidies from government. The 
public sector earns social taxes, production and import taxes (from which subsidies 
have to be subtracted). 
 
Chart 3 demonstrates that the business sector has expanded its share of GDP from 
36% in 1995 to more than 45% in 2001. After this rise came a period of stability 
until 2005. The economic boom and crisis reduced the share of the business sector 
nearly back to the level prevailing in 1995. During last two years the business sector 
has achieved over 6% increase in the share of GDP to 43.1%. Sandrine Levasseur 
(2001) has summarised the policy methods in Estonia that have helped to restore the 
position  of  business  sector’s  share  of  GDP.  The  share  of  households  reached  a 
minimum level of 27% in 2002/03. The reduction of the income tax rate followed by 
general economic environment changes in the labour market raised this share in the 
following period. It exceeded the 1995 level again in 2008–2009. In 2010-2011 the 
share of households has decreased – from 32.2% of GDP in 2009 to 29.5% of GDP 
in 2011. The public sector’s share of GDP decreased from 33% in 1995 to 28% in 
2005 – this later rose to 32.7% in 2009 and fell to 29.4% in 2011. Real employee 
income levels have more than doubled in the same time. To conclude, the public 
sector’s share of GDP in 2009 was similar to that in 1995, when Estonia experienced 
real economic growth for the first time since separating from the Soviet Union and 228 
embarking on the transition to a market economy. The advantages for the business 
sector have vanished during the economic boom and crisis periods, but recovered in 
relative terms during last years. In spite of the free movement of labour in the EU 
and  very  modest  decrease  in  average  wage  level,  the  previous  favourable 
entrepreneurship environment seems to be recovered in Estonia. The crisis has not 
remarkably  changed  Estonian  position  in  the  international  division  of  economic 
activities. Estonia continues to be the intermediate producer with low total ULC. 
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Chart 3. Share of value added in Estonian GDP (income approach) between the 
business sector, households and public sector for 1995–2011, in % (Statistics 
Estonia online database 2012, compiled and drafted by author). 
 
Table 1 characterises the current labour market situation, showing the development 
of sum of gross salaries across different economic activities (NACE-classification) 
compared to sum of gross salaries in 1995.  
 
The growth rate of administrative and support service activities in 2011 (1668%) is 
more than three times higher than the average growth rate (499%). The growth of 
information and communication activities that has the second place in ranking with 
853% in 2011 is 813% lower. In 2011 the growth rates of the sum of gross salaries 
in  both  previously  mentioned  sectors  exceeded  the  growth  level  in  2008. 
Professional, scientific and technical activities have the third position in the growth 
rate ranking  with  724%  in  2011;  however  the  2008  position  (787%)  is  still  not 
recovered. The biggest downfall in the crisis was in construction (from 870% in 
2008 to 529% in 2011) and wholesale and retail trade (from 713% in 2008 to 577% 
in 2011), but also in accommodation and food service activities (from 734% in 2008 
to  619%  in  2011).  The  growth  in  the  real  estate  sector  (613%  in  2011)  and  in 
financial  intermediation  sector  (601%  in 2011)  has  also  been  remarkable.  These 
sectors produce products that cannot be traded internationally to satisfy the needs of 
the local market. Also showing faster than average growth are public administration, 229 
defence  and  compulsory  social  security  sectors,  while  the  growth  rate  in  the 
education sector is less than average.  
 
Table 1. Dynamics of the sum of gross salary in different areas of economic 
activities (NACE-classification) for 1995-2011 (sum of the year 1995 = 100), in % 
  2000  2005  2008  2009  2010  2011 
Economic activities total  191  337  560  478  460  499 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing  129  185  278  229  240  268 
Mining and quarrying  136  146  230  214  241  267 
Manufacturing  181  318  469  375  383  429 
Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply  151  172  239  238  253  264 
Water supply; sewerage, waste 
management and remediation activities  155  249  432  361  355  380 
Construction  152  399  870  580  477  529 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles  231  414  713  602  562  577 
Transportation and storage  163  253  361  308  307  334 
Accommodation and food service 
activities  203  428  734  576  552  619 
Information and communication  245  415  756  755  742  853 
Financial and insurance activities  240  396  658  636  570  601 
Real estate activities  236  386  603  550  505  613 
Professional, scientific and technical 
activity  197  432  787  704  697  724 
Administrative and support service 
activities  327  914  1649  1414  1352  1668 
Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security  220  352  587  537  506  535 
Education  200  325  499  472  452  466 
Human health and social work 
activities  199  350  612  581  562  602 
Arts, entertainment and recreation  210  370  606  524  495  509 
Other service activities  155  250  432  418  425  450 
Source: Statistics Estonia online database 2012, compiled by author. 
 
The average growth rate in primary and manufacturing sectors fell seriously behind 
the  overall  average  growth  rate.  These  trends  do  not  indicate  a  successful 
government policy in order to create an innovation and knowledge based economy 
to produce high quality goods with high value added. Unfortunately, Estonia has 
specialised  in  cheap  and  debilitating  intermediate  production  and  the  simple 
servicing of tourists. The low growth rate in salaries in the education sector leads to 
a deficit of qualified workers required for an R&D-rich and versatile production.  
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Summary  
 
Since 1995, after Estonia had experienced its first year of economic growth, a liberal 
and extremely open economic policy has prevailed. This liberal economic policy 
was thought  to  be  the  reason  for  the  economic success  achieved.  In  reality,  the 
remarkable economic growth was achieved through an extensive inflow of foreign 
capital and not via qualitative development driven by an expansion of innovative 
export production. Foreign direct investments served mainly to conquer the internal 
market.  Unfortunately,  the  Nordic  countries  see  Estonia only  as  an  intermediate 
producer with cheap and low-skilled labour. The vast inflow of foreign credit was 
the result of ruthless competition for market share among the banks. The money 
served the interests of real estate and property developers and not that of export 
producers. 
 
EU accession did not stabilize Estonia’s economic development. On the contrary, it 
initiated various destabilizing processes. Since 2005, the direct investment outflow 
position of Estonian residents moving abroad has risen quickly and has exceeded the 
direct  investment  position  growth  from  abroad  to  Estonia.  The  economic  crisis 
resulted  in  a  finance  account  deficit  and  balance  of  payment  problems.  The 
processes that at first supported Estonia’s economic development have now reversed 
and  will  lead  to  serious  hindrances.  The  deepness  of  the  crisis  highlighted  and 
proved the unsustainability of the chosen economic development strategy. 
 
The remarkable backwardness of salaries compared to the general positive economic 
growth was concealed during the ten year period due to the relatively high inflation 
rate. As a result the share of business sector in GDP increased strongly. The massive 
inflow of foreign credit induced growth in labour force demand. The wage level 
increase at the start of the crisis re-established the 1995 proportions of GDP share 
between the business sector, households and public sector. Under the free movement 
of people in the EU, the business sector will probably not be able to re-establish the 
advantageous position in GDP share it experienced at the beginning of the ten-year 
period at the start of the new millennium. Fifteen years have changed the economic 
structure of Estonia. Unfortunately, this was designed to serve the interests of large 
multinationals and their policy of outsourcing cheap intermediate production to the 
Baltic  states.  During  the  same  period,  the  level  of  real  income  in  Estonia  has 
doubled.  The  low  wage  competition  from  Latvia  and  Lithuania  has  risen 
significantly due to Estonia’s fast wage level increases. It is unreasonable to believe 
that economic success can be achieved after the crisis and in a changed economic 
environment by applying the same economic development policy and strategy. The 
essential  assumption  (condition)  for  achieving  economic  success  lies  in  the 
development and application of knowledge and innovative spheres of society. This 
concerns education, R&D and other components of the national innovation systems. 
Innovation has to be directed to the spheres of economic activity appropriate for a 
small  and  not  highly  developed  country  on  the  basis  of  the  path-dependency 
principle,  which  means  new  areas  of  economic  development  (biotechnology, 
information and communication, software development etc) to the traditional fields 
of activity (agriculture, forestry, aqua-farming etc.) Even if we start now, it might 231 
take  more  than  ten  years to  develop  a  sustainable basis for  long-term  economic 
success. 
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2005, Vol. 166, pp 185-211. EESTI MAJANDUSKRIIS BRUTOPALGA DÜNAAMIKA ASPEKTIST 
HINNATUNA 
 
Janno Reiljan 
Tartu Ülikool 
 
Kuni majanduskriisini näis, et Eesti majanduspoliitika tagab kiire arengu. Eesti 
kuulus EL kõige kiiremini kasvavate majanduste hulka. Majanduskriis tabas aga 
Eestit väga raskelt, mis sunnib majanduspoliitikat veidi laiemalt käsitlema. Eestis 
tõsteti esiplaanile finantskapital, mida peavad teenima nii inimesed kui ka kogu 
ülejäänud majandus. Finantskapital lõi omaltpoolt inimestele ja ettevõtetele 
sissetoodud laenuraha abil illusiooni majanduskasvu ja heaolu saavutamise 
võimalusest ilma investeeringuteks sääste kogumata. Laenurahaga ülespuhutud 
buum koos sellele järgnenud majanduslanguse sügavusega sunnivad Eesti 
majanduspoliitika aluseid ja neist tulenevaid arenguperspektiive uuesti hindama. 
 
Inimesi seob majandusega nende poolt  teenitav palk, mille muutused annavad 
inimestele vahetult märku nii majanduse positiivsetest kui ka negatiivsetest 
arengutest. Palgal on kahtlemata tähtis vahetu mõju majapidamiste heaolule. 
Vähemtähtsad ei ole aga ka palgaga seotud maksudest rahastatavad sotsiaalkaitse 
kulud. Avalike teenuste pakkumise ja regionaalse arengu seisukohalt on aga suur 
tähtsus kohalike omavalitsuste eelarvesse suunataval üksikisiku tulumaksu osal, mis 
moodustab Eestis keskmiselt ca 50% kohalike omavalitsuste eelarvetuludest. 
Eeltoodust tulenevalt analüüsitakse käesolevas artiklis Eesti teed majanduskriisi ja 
selle tagajärgi empiiriliselt brutopalga arengute alusel. 
 
Artikli eesmärgiks on hinnata Eesti majanduspoliitika aluseid majanduskriisi 
kontekstis ja brutopalga arengut kriisi eel ja ajal nii üldiselt kui ka tegevusalade 
lõikes. Eesmärgi saavutamiseks püstitatakse järgmised uurimisülesanded: 
•  analüüsida Eesti arengu eduloo väidetavaid majanduspoliitilisi põhjusi; 
•  analüüsida Eesti majanduspoliitikat majanduskriisi kontekstis ja hinnata selle 
tegelikke väljavaateid; 
•  tuua teoreetiliselt välja tööjõukulude koht rahvusvahelise kaubanduse mudelites; 
•  analüüsida brutopalgaga seotud üldisi arenguid ja sektoraalseid erinevusi Eesti 
majanduses kuni majanduskriisini ja kriisi ajal. 
 
Eestil nagu teistelgi EL keskmisest arengutasemest kaugele maha jäänud riikidel 
tuleb leida arengustrateegia mahajäämuse vähendamiseks ja kõrgelt arenenud riikide 
”kinnipüüdmiseks”. Majanduse areng näiski selleks lootust andvat. Majanduskasv 
oligi terve aastakümne Eestis EL keskmisest kiirem: aastatel 1995-2004 oli SKP 
aasta keskmine reaalkasv 6,1% ja aastatel 2000-2004 koguni 7,2%. Inflatsioon oli 
langenud 1993.a ligi 90%-lt 1,4%-ni 2003.a. Kiire riigivara erastamine tõi Eestisse 
märgatava hulga välisinvesteeringuid. Madalale maksukoormusele vaatamata 
suudeti Eestis riigieelarve ülejääk saavutada ja keskvalitsusele reserve koguda. 
Kesk-Euroopa konkurentriikidest oluliselt madalama palga algtaseme tõttu suudeti 
saavutada oluline tööviljakuse tõus. Eesti poole võrra EL keskmisest tasemest 
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märkimisväärset rahulolematust.  
 
Endogeensed kasvuteooriad rõhutavad teadus-  ja arendustööle (T&A) rajanevat 
innovatsiooni kui põhilist majanduskasvu allikat. See lähenemine kujundas riigi 
arengu perspektiivide käsitlust ka Eestis. Innovatsiooniveduriks kujunemise eesmärk 
ei vastanud aga Eestis ei reaalsele arengupositsioonile ega kohale süvenevas 
integratsioonis EL-ga. Arenenud riikide poolt vaadatuna pidi  Eesti kujunema 
allhangete tegijaks rahvusvahelistele suurettevõtetele.  
 
Välisinvesteeringud on Eestisse tulnud eelkõige siseturgu teenindavatesse 
valdkondadesse, mitte eksportkaupu loovasse tootmissektorisse. Tagajärjeks on 
Eestis teenitud tulu üha suurem väljavool. Põhjuseks on järgmised asjaolud:  
•  Eesti väga lihtne kõigile sektoritele ühetaoline maksusüsteem on atraktiivne 
eelkõige Eesti turgu hõivavatele ja teenindavatele rahvusvaheliselt 
mittekaubeldavate kaupade ja teenuste pakkumisele suunatud investeeringutele. 
Innovaatilisi eksportkaupu tootvale kapitalile selline maksusüsteem atraktiivne 
ei ole.  
•  Eesti väikese turu teenindamiseks vajalikud investeeringud on väliskapitalil 
paljudes valdkondades (finantsvahendus, kommunikatsioon, kaubandus jt) 
suures osas tehtud ja nii puudub teenitud kasumile Eestis rakendus. Eestis 
teenitud kasumid otsivad üha enam rakendusala Eestist väljaspool asuvatel uutel 
turgudel. 
•  Kuna Eestis maksustatakse ainult dividendidena jaotatud kasum ja väliskapitalil 
rajanevad ettevõtted on leidnud Eestis teenitud kasumi maksuvaba väljaviimise 
kanalid, siis voolabki Eestis teenitud kasum maksuvabalt välja.  
•  Ei ole leitud ühtki olulist argumenti innovaatilise eksporttootmise või koguni 
rahvusvaheliste suurfirmade T&A Eestisse ületoomiseks. Praeguse väliskapitali 
struktuuri juures ei ole loota märkimisväärset tehnoloogilist ja teadmiste 
ülekandumist Eesti eksportivatele ettevõtetele.  
 
Madal palgatase on kahtlemata atraktiivne lihttööjõudu vajavatele ettevõtjatele, kuid 
välismaised ametiühingud sallivad seda hädapärast ainult valdkondades 
(allhangetes), milles odav tööjõud ei konkureeri otseselt arenenud riikide 
kõrgepalgalise ja kõrgelt kvalifitseeritud tööjõuga. Sotsiaalkulude madalat taset võib 
teatud piirides käsitleda majanduslikku konkurentsivõimet tõstva tegurina. Samas on 
Eesti ühinenud Euroopa Sotsiaalhartaga, mis esitab inimeste sotsiaalse kaitse 
tagamisele küllaltki kõrged nõuded. Samuti on mitmed „vanad“ EL liikmed teravalt 
tõstatanud nn sotsiaalse dumpingu probleemi, mis takistavat EL majandusliku 
integratsiooni süvenemist.  
 
Palkade ja sotsiaalse kaitse kulude kasvu surve olukorras tuleb arengu 
jätkusuutlikkuse tagamiseks saavutada produktiivsuse kiirem kasv. See on võimalik 
ainult innovatsioonile toetudes. Innovatsioonile toetuvale arengustrateegiale 
üleminekuks on aga vaja sihipärast, süsteemset ja pikaajalist meetmete kompleksi 
nii innovatsioonisüsteemi komponentide (haridus, teadus, arengustegevus, 
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ettevõtete innovatsioonistrateegiasse (klastrite väljaarendamine, koostöövõrgustike 
loomine, arendusprojektide initsieerimine, innovatsiooniprojektide toetamiseks jms) 
kaasamiseks.  
 
Riigi arenguperspektiivi hindamisel on oluline roll täita riigi konkurentsivõimel. 
Konkurentsivõime üheks tähtsamaks aspektiks on tööviljakus või selle 
pöördväärtusena tööjõu kulu toodanguühiku kohta. Tööjõukulu on määrava 
tähtsusega just rahvusvahelises hinnakonkurentsis, milles Eesti töömahukas toodang 
põhiosas osaleb. Samas ei tohiks riik hinnakonkurentsis edu saavutada madalate 
palkase ja sotsiaalse kaitse kulude ning halbade töötingimuse arvel. Seega ei peitu 
konkurentsivõime allikas mitte tööjõukulude vähendamises, vaid tööjõu 
rakendamises innovatiivsete kõrge kapitali-  ja kasumimahukusega toodete ja 
teenuste tootmisel.  
 
Rahvusvahelise kaubanduse mudelites oli tööjõukulu algselt ainsaks 
konkurentsivõimet määravaks teguriks. Vaatlusaluse riigi toodang on nende 
mudelite kohaselt rahvusvaheliselt konkurentsivõimeline juhul, kui selle riigi 
palgataseme suhe konkurentide palgatasemega on madalam selle riigi tööjõu 
tootlikkuse suhtest konkurentide tööjõu tootlikkusega. Tootmises rakendatakse 
tööjõu kõrval ka teisi sisendeid ja käesolevaks ajaks on välja arendatud 
mitmetegurilised rahvusvahelise kaubanduse mudelid (nt Porteri loodud riigi 
konkurentsieelise “teemant”), et arvesse võtta tooteühiku kogukulud. Samas on 
tööjõukulu ka mitmetegurilistes rahvusvahelise konkurentsivõime mudelites ikka 
tähtsaimal kohal. Käesolevas artiklis käsitletaksegi Eesti rahvusvahelist 
konkurentsivõimet tööjõukulude aspektist. 
 
Eestis loodud nominaalne SKP (jooksvates turuhindades) ja töötajatele makstud 
brutopalga kogusumma dünaamikast ilmneb, et aastast 1995 kuni 2003. aastani 
edestas SKP kasvutempo brutopalga kogusumma kasvutempot. Seejärel paariks 
aastaks mõlema kasvutempo võrdsustus. Eestisse EL-ga liitumise järel tulvanud 
laenurahast tingitult kasvas aga järsult nõudlus tööjõu järele, mille tulemusena tõusis 
üheltpoolt kiirenevas tempos töötajate palgatase ja teiselt poolt võeti tööle üha 
madalama tööviljakusega töötajaid. 2008. aastal SKP reaalselt juba kahanes ja ainult 
inflatsiooni tõttu nominaalselt veel veidi kasvas. Samal ajal jätkus brutopalga 
kogusumma kasv endises tempos ja edestas vaatlusaluse perioodi kokkuvõttes SKP 
kasvu: 2008. aastaks oli nominaalne SKP võrreldes 1995. aastaga kasvanud 5,82 
korda, brutopalga summa aga 5,93 korda. Majanduskriisile ei suudetud adekvaatse 
tööjõu rakendamise ja palgapoliitikaga reageerida. 2009. aasta majanduslangus SKP 
ja brutopalga proportsiooni ei muutnud: SKP oli võrreldes 1995. aastaga 5,01 korda 
suurem, brutopalga summa aga 5,16 korda suurem.  
 
Kõrge inflatsioonitaseme tingimustes (kuni aastani 2002) jäi tööjõukulu (töötajate 
brutopalga ja sotsiaalmaksude) kasvutempo pidevalt maha SKP kasvutempost ja 
tööjõukulu kogumahu suhe SKP suhtes pidevalt langes. Tööjõuga seotud kulutuste 
osa SKP-s langes väga oluliselt: 1995. aasta 52,4%-lt 44,2%-ni 2002. aastal, st 
seitsme aastaga enam kui 8 protsendipunkti võrra. Tööjõuga seotud kulude 
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suur nõudlus tööjõu järele tõstis aga tööjõuga seotud kogukulutuste taseme 51,2%-ni 
SKP-st, st kahe aastaga 7 protsendipunkti võrra. 2009. aasta järsus 
majanduslanguses jõudis tööjõukulu suhe SKP-s 51,6%-ni – sellest aspektist jõudis 
Eesti tagasi 1990. aastate keskpaiga olukorda. 
 
Brutopalga suhe SKP-ga tegi läbi sisuliselt ülaltooduga sarnase arengu: 40,3%-lt 
1995. aastal jõuti 2005. aastaks  33,5%-ni ja 2009. aastal 38,4%-ni. Kuna 
sotsiaalkindlustuse maksetele lisandus viimastel aastatel töötuskindlustusmaks 
(1,4%), siis kujunes brutopalga suhte osas SKP-ga vahe 2008. ja 1995. aasta 
tasemete vahel suuremaks võrreldes vahega tööjõuga seotud kogukulude taseme 
näitaja tasemetes. Netopalga kogusumma suhe SKP-ga arenes aga veidi teistmoodi: 
31,8%-lt SKP-s langes see suhe 27,1%-ni SKP-s 2002.-2003. aastal, kuid 2009. 
aastal moodustas see 32,7%, st ligi protsendipunkti võrra enam kui 1995. aastal. 
Põhjuseks oli üksikisiku tulumaksumäära alandamine 26% 21%-ni. 
 
Tööjõuga seotud kogukulutuste osatähtsust SKP-s võib pidada küllaltki oluliseks 
rahvusvahelise konkurentsivõime teguriks. Seejuures tuleb aga arvestada riigi 
arengutasemest tulenevat toodetavate  kaupade ja teenuste iseloomu. Kapitali-  ja 
teadusmahukate kaupade tootmisel on tööjõukulude osatähtsus väiksem, 
töömahukate lihtsate kaupade tootmisel peaks aga tööjõukulude osatähtsus olema 
suurem. Eesti kuulub rahvusvahelises tööjaotuses peamiselt tööjõumahukate odavate 
allhangete pakkujate hulka, mistõttu muudel võrdsetel asjaoludel peaks siin tööjõuga 
seotud kulude suhe SKP-ga olema EL keskmisest suurem. 
 
Võrreldes Eesti tööjõuga seotud kulutuste suhet SKP-ga EL keskmisega ja lähimate 
naabritega kui partnerite ja konkurentidega võib vaatlusaluse perioodi tinglikult 
jaotada kolmeks:  
•  Kuni 2006. aastani valitsesid suhteliselt stabiilsed, kuigi riigiti erinevad 
tendentsid. EL-s tervikuna ja vaatlusalustest riikidest Rootsis toimus tööjõuga 
seotud kulutuste ja SKP suhte langus, Soomet ja Eestit iseloomustab selle näitaja 
stabiilsus ning Lätis ja Leedus valitses tõusutendents.  
•  2007.-2009. aastate buum ja kriis üldjuhul tõstsid tööjõukulude suhet SKP-ga: 
Eestis ja Lätis järsult (need riigid jõudsid 2008. aastal Soome tasemest 
kõrgemale), Soomes mõõdukalt ja Rootsis ning eriti Leedus suhteliselt 
tagasihoidlikult. 
•  Kriisi järel prognoositakse üldise arengutendentsina tööjõuga seotud kulude ja 
SKP suhte langust. Sisuliselt oodatakse teatud mõttes varasemate 
riikidevaheliste proportsioonide taastumist. Erandlikult suutis ainult Läti 
saavutada oluliste palgamäärade kärbetega kriisiaastal 2009 tööjõuga seotud 
kulude ja SKP suhte olulise languse. EL-s tervikuna ja ka vaatlusalustes riikides 
valitses aga selle näitaja osas tõusutendents või stabiliseerumine. 
 
Kõige enam on buumi-kriisi tulemusena tööjõuga seotud kogukulutuste osas 
muutunud Eesti rahvusvaheline konkurentsipositsioon. 2006. aastal oli Eesti EL 
keskmisel tasemel olevast Soomest 2 protsendipunkti ja Rootsist 4 protsendipunkti 
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oli aga Eestis tööjõuga seotud kulutuste suhe SKP-ga sisuliselt Soomega võrdne ja 
EL keskmisest tasemest ligi 2 protsendipunkti kõrgemal. Rootsist jääb Eesti küll ligi 
4 protsendipunkti madalamale, kuid Lätist on Eesti 4 ja Leedust koguni 7 
protsendipunkti kõrgemal. Läti ja Leedu püüavad ilmselt säilitada madalate 
tööjõukuludega riigi staatust, Eestil muutub see aga vahetus konkurentsis oma Balti 
naabritega üha raskemaks. Loomulikult on Eesti SKP ja seega ka tööjõukulud 
inimese kohta nominaalselt EL keskmisest ja eriti Rootsist ja Soomest oluliselt 
madalamal (Eurostat andmetel oli lisandväärtus turuhindades inimese kohta 2009. 
aastal Eestis 8900 Eurot, Rootsis 27100 Eurot ja Soomes 27900 Eurot), seega jääb 
Eesti Põhjamaadega võrreldes ikkagi odavate allhangete pakkujaks. Läti ja Leeduga 
võrreldes peab Eesti aga pakkuma kõrgemale palgatasemele vastavat oluliselt 
suuremat tootlikkust ja/või kvaliteetsemat teenust. 
 
Ettevõtete rahvusvahelist konkurentsivõimet ei mõjuta ainult töötasude ja sellega 
seotud sotsiaalmaksete tase, vaid ka muudest maksudest tulenev koormus. Sellest 
aspektist vaadeldakse SKP kujunemist sissetulekumeetodil ja ettevõtete, 
majapidamiste ja avaliku sektori osa selles. Töötajate sissetulekuks on nende 
netopalk. Ettevõtete osaks on tootmise ülejääk ja segatulud, põhivahendite 
amortisatsioon ja riigilt saadud subsiidiumid. Avalikule sektorile laekuvad peale 
sotsiaalmaksete ka tootmis- ja impordimaksud, millest tuleb maha arvata ettevõtetele 
suunatud subsiidiumid. Ettevõtete osa SKP-s kasvas 36%-lt 1995. aastal üle 45% 
2001. aastaks ja stabiliseerus sellel tasemel 2005. aastani. Buum ja kriis langetasid 
ettevõtete osa SKP-s sisuliselt tagasi 1995. aasta tasemele. Majapidamiste (töötajate) 
osa SKP-s langes miinimumini (ca 27%) 2002-2003. aastaks, aga hakkas seejärel 
(alguses tulumaksumäära alanemise ja hiljem majanduskeskkonna ja tööturu 
olukorra muutuste mõjul) suurenema, jõudes 2008.-2009. aastaks kõrgemale 1995. 
aasta tasemest. Avaliku sektori osa SKP-s langes 1995. aasta ligi 33%-lt 2005. 
aastaks 28%-ni, misjärel tõusis 2009. aastaks 32%-ni. Kokkuvõttes on SKP jaotuses 
ettevõtlussektori, majapidamiste ja avaliku sektori vahel taastunud ligikaudselt 1995. 
aasta olukord. Reaalsissetulekute tase on aga sel perioodil Eestis kasvanud enam kui 
kaks korda. Ettevõtlusele mõneks ajaks kujunenud erakordselt soodsad tingimused 
on buumis-kriisis kaotsi läinud ja nende taastamine on EL avatud tööjõuturu 
tingimustes vähetõenäoline. Seda näitab Eesti kogemus majanduskriisis: kadusid 
peamiselt töökohad, kuid keskmise palga langus oli tagasihoidlik. Majanduskasvu 
saavutamiseks on ilmselt vaja leida sisuliselt uus strateegia, mis võimaldaks 
rahvusvahelises konkurentsis edu saavutada töötajate oluliselt kasvanud 
sissetulekute tingimustes. 
 
Eestis on aastatel 1995 –  2009 teistest tegevusaladest kiiremini arenenud 
kinnisvaraarendus ja sellega seotud äritegevused, ehitusvaldkond, hotellid ja 
restoranid, hulgi-  ja jaekaubandus, aga samuti finantsvahendus. Need on 
tegevusalad, mis loovad rahvusvaheliselt mittekaubeldavaid produkte siseturule. 
Keskmisest kiiremini on brutopalga summa kasvanud ka avalikus halduse, 
riigikaitse ja kohustusliku sotsiaalkindlustuse valdkonnas, samas kui palgasumma 
kasvutempo hariduses jääb alla keskmise. Keskmisest kasvutempost kaugele maha 
jääb aga palgasumma kasv primaarsektoris, aga ka töötlevas tööstuses. 
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rahvusvaheliselt konkurentsivõimelisest pakkumisest kui riiklikust prioriteedist 
selliste arengutendentside puhul küll rääkida ei saa. Eesti on spetsialiseerunud 
odavale allhankele ja turistidele lihtsate teenuste pakkumisele. Hariduse palgakulude 
keskmisest madalam kasvutempo tähendab aga, et teadusmahuka innovaatilise 
tootmise arendamiseks ei suudeta piisava kvalifikatsiooniga töötajaid vajalikul 
hulgal ette valmistada.  
 
Analüüsides andmeid Eestis loodud lisandväärtuse struktuuri kohta tegevusalade 
lõikes saame ettekujutuse rahvusvahelise konkurentsivõime arengust. Töötlev 
tööstus on 15 aastaga kaotanud kolmandiku oma osatähtsusest ja langenud 
lisandväärtuse loomisel veidi enam kui 14 protsendiga 2009. aastal 
kinnisvaraarenduse ja sellega seotud äritegevuse (enam kui 21%) järel teisele 
kohale. Sellega edestab töötlev tööstus ainult napilt hulgi- ja jaekaubandust ning 
veonduse, laonduse ja side valdkonda. Primaarsektori harud on kaotanud keskeltläbi 
poole oma niigi tagasihoidlikust osatähtsusest lisandväärtuse loomisel. Ainult 
monopoolsed elektrienergia-, gaasi-  ja veevarustus on hinnatõusu abil oma 
osatähtsuse säilitanud. Kokkuvõttes ei saa Eestit enam tööstusriigiks nimetada, sest 
teenindussektor on selges ülekaalus. Paraku ei ole need teenused kõrget 
lisandväärtust loovad. Seega on Eesti tõepoolest võtmas sisse meile arenenud riikide 
firmade poolt ette nähtud vaheprodukti (allhange, teenus) tootja positsiooni. Eesti 
majanduskasvu perspektiivid sõltuvad seega eelkõige välisnõudlusest allhangete ja 
teenuste järele, sest majapidamiste suure laenukoormuse tõttu ei suuda sisenõudlus 
olulist kasvu esile kutsuda. Välisnõudluse osas tuleb Eesti ettevõtetel aga üha enam 
arvestada Läti ja Leedu konkurentsiga, sest neis riikides on hinnakonkurentsis 
oluline palgataseme eelis. 
 
Majanduskriis vahetult peamiste tegevusalade osas mingeid olulisi tendentsimuutusi 
kaasa ei toonud, äramärkimist väärib ainult ehitussektori osatähtsuse märgatav 
langus. Buumi ajal kiirelt paisunud finantsvahendus pidi “laenumulli” lõhkemisel 
mõningast kahju kandma ja osatähtsus vastavalt langes. Avaliku sektori 
tegevusalade osatähtsus suurenes nii buumi kui ka kriisi ajal. Üheks põhjuseks on 
kindlasti asjaolu, et avalik sektor absorbeerib olulise osa EL toetussummadest, 
samas ei olnud majanduslanguse tingimustes võimalik kärpida haridus-  ja 
tervishoiukulusid majanduslangusega samas proportsioonis. Kuna majanduskriis ei 
toonud kaasa hindade langust ja käivitunud on uus hinnataseme tõus, siis tähendavad 
kärped hariduses ja tervishoius paratamatult pakutava teenuse kvaliteedi langust, mis 
pikemas perspektiivis mõjuks negatiivselt rahvusvahelisele konkurentsivõimele. 
Lühiajaliselt tähendab aga avaliku sektori osatähtsuse tõus SKP kasutamisel Eesti 
positsiooni nõrgenemist odava allhanke ja teenuse pakkujana. Ka sellest aspektist 
vaadatuna on arenguedu võimalik ainult uuele strateegiale üle minnes ja 
majanduspoliitikat oluliselt muutes.  
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